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CONTRADICTION AND REVISION: PROGRESSIVE
FEMINIST LEGAL SCHOLARS RESPOND TO
MARY JOE FRUG

JUDI GREENBERG*
MARTHA MINOW**
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER***

Liz: Let me start by saying what Mary Joe's article1 means to
me. The importance of Mary Joe's article, I think, is in her effort
to grapple with a number of contradictions. The first level of
contradiction is between the Hogan decision's vision of equality
as sameness, which Mary Joe criticizes, and the dissatisfaction
with this approach represented by Carol Gilligan's In a Different
Voice.
The second level of contradiction is within Gilligan's work
itself. Mary Joe reveals the textual basis for the conservative
interpretation of Gilligan's idea of difference, and then offers an
alternative, progressive reading of Gilligan. Implicit in both levels
of contradiction are the conservative and progressive effects of
embracing femininity as women's separate experience, or different culture. Mary Joe experiences these contradictions within
herself, and changes her position as the article develops.
In writing the article, Mary Joe reveals the contradictions
within her own experience of Gilligan, her thoughts about femininity, and her perspectives on liberal equality. The acceptance
of contradiction, in Mary Joe's view, requires an openness to
constant revision of one's own thinking.
Judi: I agree. And I want to highlight two important themes that
you raise: contradiction and revision. Through her discussions of
Hogan and Carol Gilligan's work, Mary Joe shows that the same* Judi Greenberg is professor of law at New England School of Law.
** Martha Minow is professor of law at Harvard Law School.
*** Elizabeth Schneider is professor of law at Brooklyn Law School.
'Mary Joe Frug, ProgressiveFeminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "ADifferent
Voice"?, in this volume at 37.
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ness-difference debate is unproductive. Mary Joe recognizes that
the "sameness" approach has been crucial in ensuring that a
woman's sex is not used against her. Yet, Mary Joe also concedes
that Carol Gilligan's work instills an empowering gender pride in
women and, I might add, occasional gender envy in men.
While both the sameness and difference approaches have benefits, each is insufficient on its own to advance the position of
women. The sameness approach is limited because it measures
women by a male standard and is inapplicable to situations in
which women are different from men. The difference approach
is limited because conservatives have found in it fodder for reinforcing debilitating stereotypes of women. For instance, conservatives have used Gilligan's idea that, for women, justice is a
"web" of interconnected relationships to prove that women are
born nurturers. As Mary Joe says, Gilligan does not recognize
that women may feel trapped in the stickiness of "the web."
In order to move beyond the suffocating sameness-difference
dichotomy, Mary Joe offers a new reading of Gilligan's work.
This new reading of In a Different Voice focuses on Gilligan's
use of women's formerly silenced voices to reveal the exclusions
and omissions in the dominant discourse of moral development.
These points of omission open the dominant theory to reconception. Thus, Mary Joe's use of poststructuralist theory to expose
contradictions is not an abstract game, but an effort to invest
feminists with a powerful tool for reconceiving the debates that
ensnare them.
Martha: Let me endorse everything that you have both said and
also say that I understand this piece as a pivotal point in Mary
Joe's own historical journey. Mary Joe was working on an analysis of Carol Gilligan's work for five or six years. This piece
represents the final iteration of that project. She presented versions of the work at different conferences and talked with different people about it. Each of the points of endorsement and criticism of Gilligan's varied positions that you both have alluded2 to
in some sense represent Mary Joe's own intellectual journey.
2 Mary Joe's intellectual journey is also reflected in her scholarship. Her first law review
article was the classic work and family piece Securing Job Equalityfor Women: Labor

Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979). Mary Joe's contracts
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In this final, though incomplete, version, what does Mary Joe's
article represent? It seems to me Gilligan became a template for
Mary Joe's own discomfort with the narrowness of many of the
debates that conjoin feminism and law reform. Asking whether
women should be treated as if they are the same as men or as if
they are different is too limited, in her view. Mary Joe does not
ignore the sameness-difference debate. Instead she says, "Look,
we have to engage with it. Whether we want to or not, other
people are using notions of sameness and difference to define the
terms of the discussion." At the same time, Mary Joe ruptures
the dichotomy. She acknowledges thereby the paradox that so
much of poststructuralist analysis reveals: if you focus on the
dichotomy that you think is a problem, you may be reiterating
the problem by focusing on the dichotomy.
Gilligan looks to gender and the attributions of gender difference, according to Mary Joe, as a clue to the defects in the
historical construction of moral development theory. To pick up
on your point, Judi, Mary Joe suggests that whenever there's a
discussion of gender difference, there's a clue to something wrong
in the discourse; there's a clue to the patterns of power that
initiate the enterprise of differentiation itself. Gilligan's work
reveals the defect in the enterprise of moral development theory:
Piaget and Kohlberg left women and girls out of their studies
either due to lack of interest or because their presence messed
up the results.
Any enterprise that results in a finding of gender difference
suggests not that there are gender differences, but that the methodology of the enterprise is suspect. If you use the attributions
of gender difference as a clue to reading a text, instead of using
the text as a clue to gender differences, then you have a method
for reformulating the enterprise. For example, in Mary Joe's
piece, Re-Reading Contracts:A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.

L. Rav. 1065 (1985), marked a shift to a deliberately self-conscious method and concern
for the relationship between readers and authors with their multiplicity of perspectives.
Next, Mary Joe produced her post-modernism manifesto, A Postmodern Feminist Legal
Manifesto, 105 HARV. L. Rv. 1045 (1992); her article on the Sears case, Sexuality
Equality and Sexual Difference in American Law, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. (forthcoming

1992); and her article on impossibility doctrine, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine:A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1992), each of

which work through the possibilities of postmodernism for feminism and for legal
strategies.
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analysis, assertions of gender difference in a contracts casebook
are clues that teaching materials historically left women out or
presented them as stereotypes. The same methodology applied
to the college admissions or hiring process yields a justification
for affirmative action. If you have a selection process that produces an all white-male result, you could say, "Well, now we've
established that there are race and gender differences, using our
neutral criteria." On the other hand, you could say the result
demonstrates not inherent differences but a problem with the
selection criteria. If you start with the assumption that in fact
men and women, people of color and whites, are all eligible for
society's opportunities and that talents are distributed well across
the differences, there's something wrong with an enterprise that
doesn't produce something resembling a proportional result.
Judi: Mary Joe's critique of the dominant power structure, or
the enterprise, as you say, is not just a demand for participation.
The claim isn't that diversity on its own would change the power
structure. For example, Mary Joe begins to demand that Justice
O'Connor represent her as a woman on the Supreme Court, but
then abandons the demand because of its essentialist assumptions. Instead, Mary Joe suggests that the dichotomization of
gender misrepresents the complexities of identity. Gender is a
construct. She complicates our ideas about gender identity by
noting her preferences for the decision of the male dissenters in
Hogan.
Liz: One thing that's very interesting to me is whether or not
the alternative Mary Joe offers is largely methodological or procedural, as opposed to substantive (although as a teacher of Civil
Procedure I don't want to suggest that procedure and substance
are necessarily opposite, to the contrary, procedure and substance are deeply linked). Postmodernism could be described as
a primarily methodological commitment to revealing a multiplicity of meanings and a commitment to a process of reading for
internal contradictions in texts.
Now, there is an interesting back and forth in Mary Joe's article
between her commitment to methodology and her commitment
to substantive issues. On the one hand, Mary Joe is interested in
the reader's perspective and in developing a method for finding
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"clues" to inequality in the structure of "neutral" texts. On the
other hand, Mary Joe is very clear in the article about the substantive issues that she wants challenged, for example, the way
in which the sameness-difference dichotomy has been used to
disadvantage women in no-fault divorce, and the way in which
the inattention to male fertility issues has shaped the debate about
reproductive hazards in the workplace.
Mary Joe uses a process of revision and questioning, then, to
come to terms with issues with which she is deeply concerned.
However, the application of this process of revision to these
larger substantive themes is, perhaps, the area of Mary Joe's
work that is least developed. If we began questioning substantive
issues we felt deeply committed to, where would we take that?
Judi: Before we go on, I want to come back to the question of
whether postmodern methodology is procedural or substantive.
Mary Joe's methodology, employing gender diffences as a key to
understanding the text, enables her to uncover a new substantive
reading of Gilligan. Her methodology can also be called on to
deconstruct the procedure/substance dichotomy. I think the substantive possibilities of postmodernism were important to her.
Martha: One of the portions of this article that struck me very
powerfully is where Mary Joe describes quite candidly a feminist
dismissal of Gilligan under the epithet "crude Gilliganism." She
has this wonderful sentence: "Although in my circle the reductive
polarization of Gilligan's argument is almost always drowned by
the epithet 'crude Gilliganism,' our ritualistic denunciations cause
me to suspect the dangers posed by conservative readings may
be masked for feminists by our teasing, know-it-all dismissals and
also in some cases by our desire to avoid examining too closely
the question of our own feminine identities." I want to have a
little meditation on this sentence because I think that it is powerful, evocative, and unfortunately painfully true. It also illuminates the discussion that you both have just started on procedure
versus substance and the politics of postmodernism.
The rereading of Gilligan that Mary Joe offers is, very simply
put, that by including girls and women in a study of moral reasoning Gilligan found a different pattern of thought that has been
given the name the "care perspective." Gilligan contrasts the
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"care perspective," which she imagines as a web, with the hierarchical "rights perspective," represented by a ladder. I think
that it is absolutely clear in Gilligan's own work that she thinks
males as well as females have access to this "care perspective."
If you take that seriously, then instead of the one scale of moral
development posited by Kohlberg and Piaget, there are different,
interactive axes of development. Not only does Mary Joe demonstrate the complexity of Gilligan's idea of moral development,
she demonstrates the internal contradictions in Gilligan's text.
She furnishes ample evidence from the text for both conservative
and progressive readings.
It's at that point that I personally get very worried. Sometimes
it seems to me that the embrace of contradiction may lead to
paralysis. But I am then taken aback by the particular sentence
of Mary Joe's that I read a moment ago. It's not as though the
people who try to shield themselves from complexity and from
ambiguity are so much better off when it comes to political mobilization or when it comes to the search for truth. When we
deny the complexity of issues, we deny complexity and diversity
within the group we want to mobilize. Mary Joe challenges not
only readers of texts, but people interested in social change.
Liz: I strongly agree with what Martha has said. I want to emphasize that the acknowledgment of complexity and, simultaneously, of our need to avoid being paralyzed by complexity, is
fundamental to the development of feminist theory and to legal
theory generally.
One aspect of complexity is the self-reflective nature of Mary
Joe's article. In fact, her interest and commitment to a postmodern methodology and her interest in the contributions that postmodernism makes to feminist theory has a great deal to do with
the natural self-reflectiveness evident in Mary Joe's writing and
in her constant effort to challenge her own assumptions. Her
capacity to refashion herself, her commitment to change, to revision, to openness, was just extraordinary. Part of what we have
seen as the enormous outpouring of mourning, and the energy
that people have devoted to her work in response to her loss, is
attributable to the unique role that Mary Joe played, both in
personal interaction and in her work, in challenging many people
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to get beyond their automatic assumptions and their automatic
frameworks.
For instance, I believe that the sentence Martha read is central
to the article and Mary Joe's work. I loved the phrase "our
teasing, know-it-all dismissals" the first time I read it, and
thought: there are other things in Mary Joe's writing that show
her awareness of our tendency to categorize, but there's nothing
that says it so clearly and so sharply. Mary Joe challenges us to
share her rejection of categorical, simplistic, dichotomized tendencies. Feminist theory has not been immune to these tendencies. Mary Joe urges us to talk honestly about points of commonality and difference, and to develop political commitment
without simplification.
Judi: I absolutely agree that the phrase "our teasing, know-it-all
dismissals" shows Mary Joe's openness to other ideas, even ideas
that might have been anathema to people who formed her
"circle."
Mary Joe says that our desire not to look at "crude Gilliganism"
masks our desire to avoid examining our feminine identities.
When she discusses Hogan, Mary Joe looks anxiously for a
feminine identity in Justice O'Connor's voice. She doesn't find a
feminine voice, but the question is, what would it have sounded
like? What did she anticipate finding? Or hope to find?
We have identified Mary Joe's frustration with the constraint
of "crude Gilliganism," but what I find so important is Mary Joe's
use of postmodernism to liberate herself from this constraint.
Justice O'Connor's voice really interested Mary Joe because Justice O'Connor herself broke the limits of that crude image of
femininity. So, in uncovering Justice O'Connor's experience as
a woman, Mary Joe asked questions of her such as: What was
her experience in the law firm? How did she react when no one
offered her a job when she graduated from law school? Mary Joe
wanted to understand Justice O'Connor's voice in context, not
in the abstract.
Liz: One thing I want to add to that, Judi, is that all of us,
including Mary Joe, struggle with Gilligan's appeal to essential
femininity. That appeal is not something to minimize. After using
In a Different Voice in teaching gender discrimination for a num-
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ber of years now, I find it an extremely useful vehicle for exploring notions of women's different experience. Reading Gilligan
for many students is an extremely powerful affirmation of a
crudely essentialistic but nonetheless recognizable vision of women's experience. When students read Gilligan, they respond to it
in an emotional, gut manner that is important to them
psychologically.
Martha: My mother-in-law couldn't put it down. She said that it
explained to her so much she knew from her own life.
Judi: Although one of the things that Mary Joe notes as a political
danger of Gilligan's work is that it valorizes a white middle-class
vision of femininity. I also think Mary Joe would have found
danger in the seductivenenss of Gilligan's work exactly because
of its propensity to reinforce the traditional image of women.
Liz: Mary Joe's characterization of Gilligan's web as a spider
web is particularly useful because I have found that, in years of
working with Gilligan, in conversations and classes, Gilligan's
web imagery has always had great appeal. Mary Joe's vision of
the spider web as a trap; the sticky, yucky dimensions of it, is
brilliant. The web expresses the contradiction in our yearning for
something that both connects us to each other and traps us. The
spider web is an image of death.
You know, I was struck when I read the part about Justice
O'Connor because it reminded me of the contradictory responses
we had many years ago when she was appointed to the Supreme
Court. We yearned for a woman Justice in the essentialist hope
that that woman would bring a unique set of perceptions to her
work on the Court. We hoped that Justice O'Connor would not
disappoint us, and we searched her prior opinions for some sign
of her experience as a woman; for a "different voice." Given
Justice O'Connor's politics and what she'd done up to the time
of her appointment, that hope was not realistic.
Martha: I recall a meeting with a group of women judges during
which Gilligan's theories were presented. All the women judges
were up in arms. They were just outraged. In talking with several
women judges I heard them say essentially, "You have no idea.
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We've struggled our whole lives to be taken seriously as persons,
as lawyers, and now we have you young whippersnapper law
professors telling us that we're different. That's just the idea
people used to impede our success in the past." Let's locate this
view in history. That sameness strategy was crucial to women
seeking equal rights in the 1960s and 1970s. Then, as Mary Joe's
paper says quite well, there was a coincidence in the timing of
the publication of Gilligan's book and the recognition among
many feminist litigators that the sameness strategy was not
achieving a revision of the world. Gilligan's book appealed both
to those who had never been interested in claiming women were
the same as men and those who saw the theory of difference as
a new strategy for empowering women.
Judi: Certainly Mary Joe shows that Suzanna Sherry's attempt
to find Justice O'Connor's voice as a woman is a false victory.
Mary Joe cites various cases demonstrating that the inclusionary
aspects of Justice O'Connor's communitarianism require the exclusion of groups, such as homosexuals, that she chooses not to
admit to the community. If the "different voice" described by
Gilligan is inclusionary, then it's not Justice O'Connor's voice.
Liz: Mary Joe's decision to use the term "feminine," sometimes
in quotes, but not in quotes consistently throughout the piece,
reflects the conflicting responses she felt toward the idea of femininity. In this article, Mary Joe rejects femininity, or at least
identifies the artifice in the concept and the social construction
of femininity. I think there is a fundamental contradiction in the
acknowledgment of a desire for O'Connor to articulate a feminine
voice and the struggle over what the social construct "femininity"
means.
Martha: One thing we could do is talk briefly about Hogan, since
it provides one element of the article that we haven't discussed.
One issue implicit in Mary Joe's discussion of Hogan is whether
there is a justifiable defense of schools that are segregated by
race or gender where the school is for the group that has been
excluded, historically, from other schools. Mary Joe identified
the defense of women's schools as an issue that was neglected
by Justice O'Connor and recognized by the dissenters. Yet Mary
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Joe didn't like the dissenter's way of justifying segregated schools
either. Is there another way of justifying all-female or all-black
schools? This question speaks, for example, to political strategies
related to the Detroit effort to have an all-black-male public high
3
school.
Judi: I think that Mary Joe is disappointed by how little the issue
of single-sex education surfaces in Hogan. As a graduate of
Wellesley College, this issue may have been particulary important
to Mary Joe. She certainly would have been the first to recognize
that her experiences there give her a particular perspective on
women's schools.
Another interesting aspect of Mary Joe's discussion of Hogan
is that she finds to her surprise the rudiments of a feminine voice
in the male dissenters' opinion. This discovery shores up Mary
Joe's non-essentialistic understanding of gender.
Martha: You know, I'm just making this up as I speak, but I
wonder if the method of this paper offers a way to think about
the Detroit proposal. Let me just try it. If there's an argument
for race segregation and sex segregation in public schooling, this
paper would suggest that we shouldn't get into a big discussion
about whether people are really different and would different
school programs be better. We should instead ask, "How does
the imprint of a legacy of sex and race dichotomies tell us something about what's wrong in the whole construction of the enterprise of schooling, the allocation of resources to schooling, and
so forth?" Is that a way that this paper might speak? Recently, I
have been persuaded by those who say that a plan like Detroit's
is writing off black women.
Liz: I agree, although I have changed my opinion on the issue
of single-sex education. I use Hogan when I teach to talk about
the values of single-sex education, which then leads to a discussion of Gilligan. The issue of sex-segregated education is obviously linked to the issue of race-segregated education. Our
3 See, e.g., Shawn Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich.
1991); Ron Russell, 1,200 Want In At 3 All-Male Academies, THE DETROIT NEWS, June
25, 1991, at IA; Editorial, Male Academy, THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 2, 1991, at 8A.
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reactions to sex-segregation and race-segregation show both a
desire for and a recognition of the need for specificity. Segregated
institutions can have an impact that is empowering, by creating
a liberated zone and space for a particular kind of growth. At the
same time, we reject the notion of segregation. For example,
Martha pointed out that the Detroit school plan to segregate black
men leaves out women of color.
Martha: There's an intriguing phrase in Mary Joe's piece that
she doesn't develop: the social control dimension of Justice
O'Connor's opinions, not just in Hogan, but also Hardwick.
When the distinctions we have been discussing are used to serve
the interests of those in power, we should take it as a warning.
Liz: On the other hand, I think it is very hard to give up our
yearning for difference, a yearning for group identity on the basis
of group characteristics, narrow and limited though they may be.
I see yearning for identity in so many things. I see it in the
Detroit debate. I see it in the arguments about sex-segregated
colleges. Gilligan brings those issues to the surface, but they have
been part of our struggle in many different contexts for a very
long time. We can't ignore the desire for identity that these
debates reflect: the deep, underlying, human desire for affirmation of identity. One of the strengths of Mary Joe's article is that
she acknowledges that yearning for identity at the same time that
she rejects any simple dichotomy as a way of resolving it.
Judi: Mary Joe recognizes the irony of simultaneously trying to
fight prescribed gender norms and having to use the language of
gender to break out of them. I agree with Liz that Mary Joe
understood the power of group identities and the politics of group
identities. But Mary Joe was very self-conscious about not using
essentialist forms of identity politics. That tactic would have been
simply too exclusionary, too restrictive.
Martha: I think that's right, and if I have a worry about this
enterprise it's that it is scary and difficult. At times I want something that can go on a bumper sticker. I want a banner. And this
is not that. This problematizes (which is itself too complicated a
word) every word.
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Judi: "Question Authority"?
Martha: That is a bumper sticker. Actually, I tend to give as
baby gifts T-shirts that say "Question Authority." I've been told
that's not a very nice thing to do to parents.
Liz: I was just going to identify as the parent in that context. I
have a divided consciousness here.
Martha: I'm very taken with this new book by Tom Grey, our
friend at Stanford. 4 He has argued that Wallace Stevens, the poet,
was trying in his poetry to shift people's aesthetic sensibility from
the desire for romantic Victorian images that are clear and have
representational references to an acceptance and indeed an appreciation of complexity and ambiguity and difficulty. Mary Joe's
work is insisting on complexity, contingency, and constant revision. I admire it and yet I worry because I think that this moment
of economic crisis and international instability is the moment
when someone like David Duke appears. And David Duke has
slogans. David Duke says, "I have answers." I worry about
failure on our part to respond to people's need for answers.
Liz: I think there are two important dimensions to what you're
saying, Martha. One dimension is the need to accept long-term
struggle. The recognition of complexity does not have to be
paralyzing. Complexity doesn't mean that we can't adopt strategies at particular historical times, but that we understand the
contingent nature of those strategies, and the degree to which
strategies chosen at particular times will necessarily have to
undergo revision. We need the maturity, tolerance for instability,
and tolerance for complexity that we, as feminists and social
activists, have not always had.
On the other hand, our desire for slogans shows a desire for
images that can easily be translated by the mass of people on a
grassroots level. We want slogans with a simple message to combat the David Duke phenomenon and the rise of racial and ethnic
hatred. We see, for example, the appeal of a simple idea, such
4 THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF

POETRY (1991).
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as national health insurance, in the Harris Wofford Senate victory
against Richard Thornburgh in Pennsylvania.5 But learning to
speak more directly to the needs of people and making strategic
choices about how to get our message across does not necessarily
conflict with recognition of the complexity of issues in the longterm, theoretical debate.
Judi: The problem of slogans is the dilemma of difference: slogans can't capture complexity in a way that's useful. Eventually,
they come around and hit us on the back. Because we have a
variety of constituencies, we can't envision the public as "a
public" having identical interests, needs, and understandings. Too
easily, slogans can simply reinforce the views of a dominant
group.
But slogans are also fun and funny. Maybe there's some critical
political potential in their irony. Mary Joe had a sticker on her
bulletin board depicting a child's drawing of a skirted school girl,
white with black braids and made-up red lips. It read: "Girls are
Super! Girls are Terrific! Boys Stink!" It's funny in part because
of its expansive gender claims. These gender claims immediately
undercut themselves-they're too preposterous. The slogan simultaneously asserts gender identity and questions it.
Martha: Actually, my favorite slogan is the button that says,
"Wearing buttons is not enough." And I think in many ways that
Mary Joe's article is saying the same thing. It's saying, "A different voice is not enough. Asserting it is not enough." We have
to have question marks in each of our enterprises so that contingency and attention to context, as Judi just mentioned, become
part of the process of change, not something that we accidentally
find, time after time.

See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, The 1991 Election: The Winner Man in the News: Harris
Llewellyn Wofford Jr., Backstage No Longer, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1991, at IA.

